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1. INTRODUCTION 
Leveraged buy-outs (LBO) are facing an increasing success in France. The amounts 
invested in these transactions were 600 million euros in 1997 and almost 2 billion 
euros in 2001. In 2002, because of some large operations, the invested amount was 
about 4,5 billion euros (AFIC, 2002a). France is a leader in this market in Continental 
Europe, but it is still far behind the United Kingdom. 
LBO transactions can be defined as acquisitions of a significant equity stake of a 
company by private venture capital investors using additional debt financing. They 
comprise both the case of Management Buy-outs (MBOs) and Management Buy-ins 
(MBIs). In a MBO, current management with the aid of financial investors takes over 
the company‟s equity from its previous owners, whereas in a MBI, an external 
management team funded by outside investors takes over the control of a given target 
company. At the end of the 1990‟s, Investor-led Buy-outs (IBO) also developed 
(Wright and Robbie, 1996). They are deals in which venture capital investors initiate 
and carry out the transaction, management playing a minor role. The main sources of 
buy-outs are, on the one hand, groups which desinvest subsidiary companies and, on 
the other hand, family companies encountering succession problems. Sometimes 
groups decide to sell one part of their subsidiary companies in order to focus on their 
core business or because of financial difficulties. Since the evolution of the LBO as a 
common form of takeover of public or private firms in the 1980s, several companies, 
hereafter referred to as « LBO firms », specialized in making this type of investment 
with venture capital raised in the private equity market. 
Throughout the past two decades, one of the chief purposes of LBO studies has been 
to examine if LBO transactions influence the target‟s ex-post performance. Anglo-
Saxon studies show unanimously that LBO targets outperform their industry 
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counterparts after the transaction. Among the different factors that can explain this 
result we find the tax savings argument (Kaplan, 1989) and the free cash flow (FCF) 
hypothesis developed by Jensen (1989). According to the author, high debt is one way 
of better allocating cash to corporate investors. By reducing management's 
opportunity for inefficiency, increased leverage may make the firm more efficient. 
Among other things, managers have less leeway to involve the firm in negative Net 
Present Value (NPV) projects.  
The Anglo-Saxon LBO literature tends to use datasets that sample public companies, 
that is to say public-to-private (PTP) transactions, and this work implicitly assumes 
that conclusions drawn from large, public companies apply equally well to small, 
private ones. However, given the substantial qualitative differences between public 
and private companies, the validity of this assumption may be problematic. Drawing 
conclusions from samples of public targets potentially undermines the generalizability 
of the interpretations and weakens the external validity of the evidence. Moreover, 
only a handful of PTP are completed in France each year because of a number of 
issues, arising from French legislation, that make PTPs more difficult than elsewhere 
(AFIC, 2002b)
1
.  
In fact, recent research undertaken in France (Desbrières and Schatt, 2002a, 2002b) 
provides initial evidence suggesting that the implications of LBOs do vary across 
private and public targets and across countries. Desbrières and Schatt (2002a), for 
instance, found that, for a sample of private French LBO targets, an abnormal falling 
of their economic return and margins occured after the transaction.  
This study seeks to extend prior research on LBOs in three ways. First, we focus on 
LBOs on French private firms in particular. Second, we investigate through a logit 
regression essential financial differences between LBO versus non-LBO targets in 
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order to study to what extent French LBO targets‟ financial characteristics prior to the 
deal can explain their underperformance after the transaction. Third, we distinguish 
between LBO targets according to the vendor type and deal objectives. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
arguments and research hypotheses. After a description of the research design in 
section 3, a discussion of the empirical findings appears in section 4. A discussion of 
the implications of our findings and new avenues for research concludes in section 5. 
 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Several theories have been offered to explain the sources of value which make LBOs 
feasible. These theoretical explanations for LBOs, which can be described as the FCF 
hypothesis and the tax savings hypothesis, can be used to predict the types of firms 
likely to engage in LBOs. Moreover, we present the specific criteria that are used by 
LBO firms in their acquisition rationale. 
 
(i) Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
In his well-known FCF hypothesis that applies concepts from agency theory (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to the LBO setting, Jensen (1986, 1989) argues that 
managers in firms with large FCF
2
 have an incentive to waste organizational 
resources on negative NPV projects, rather than pay out the excess cash to 
shareholders through dividends or share repurchase schemes. Jensen argues that the 
impact of FCF on organizational inefficiencies is most pronounced in low growth 
firms because such firms have few positive NPV investment opportunities. The FCF 
hypothesis has generated tremendous interest in the finance literature and has been 
empirically verified (Maupin, 1987; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Singh, 1990; Ambrose 
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and Winters, 1992; Opler and Titman, 1993). For instance, Singh (1990) finds in his 
study that firms undergoing buyouts have higher levels of liquidity than their industry 
counterparts. In France, Desbrières and Schatt (2002a) show that acquired firms 
exhibit an excellent liquidity compared to their rivals prior to the transaction, which 
can be explained by Jensen‟s theory of FCF. This leads to the first hypotheses H1 and 
H2. 
H1:  The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be positively related 
to its level of FCF. 
H2: The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be negatively related 
to its growth opportunities. 
 
(ii) Tax Savings Hypothesis 
Another proposed factor to explain LBO activity is the potential leverage-induced tax 
savings involved in these operations. The tax-savings hypothesis has received much 
attention in past research. It follows from the tax shield of interest payments on the 
increased debt in an LBO. Marais, Schipper and Smith (1989) present evidence that 
tax savings are correlated with the LBO premium. Kaplan (1989) also finds that the 
tax benefits are a large source of wealth in LBOs. The tax savings hypothesis, H3, 
states the following. 
H3:  The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be positively related 
to its level of income taxes. 
 
(iii) Hypotheses Related to the LBO Firms’ Acquisition Rationale 
LBO firms look for a variety of characteristics in potential investments. Best 
acquisition targets should exhibit a distinctive profile. Gottschalg (2002) notes that 
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« unlike strategic acquirers, LBO firms typically do not put much emphasis on aspects 
like resource relatedness or strategic fit between existing portfolio companies and 
potential takeover candidates. In their acquisition rationale, they primarily rely on a 
set of generic criteria regarding industry-level dynamics and financial benchmarks ». 
Thus, many LBO firms are similar in their basic criteria for takeovers candidates 
(mature industries, stable cash flows, low operational risk). 
The purpose of LBO firms is double. They seek, first, to maximize their future capital 
gain from the sale of shares and, second, to minimize the risk of non-payment of the 
acquisition debt. LBOs create heavy leverage that may be inefficient for firms that 
expect unstable earnings or plan to engage in new projects. Moreover, heavy leverage 
may carry with it costs associated with an increased likelihood of insolvency. Since 
the company‟s cash flow is used to service the debt, « the most significant risk in an 
LBO is that the company will not achieve the cash flow necessary to service the large 
acquisition debt » (Maupin, 1987). Consequently, LBO firms and lenders are most 
interested in the target‟s future and past capacity to generate large and steady levels of 
cash flow. In France, Desbrières et Schatt (2002a) clearly show that companies 
undergoing LBOs are the ones which have the greatest ability to remunerate the funds 
provided by investors and lenders. They find that acquired firms are more profitable 
than industry average prior to the LBO, which is consistent with the results of Singh 
(1990). They also point out a significant lower gearing of LBO targets prior to the 
transaction : « before the LBO, firms enjoyed on the average a higher borrowing 
capacity than their industry counterparts, which can be considered as a key factor in 
the successful set up of the financial structure of the operation ».  
Several characteristics make it possible to define an eligible target for LBO 
transactions. Thoumieux (1996) and Grange et al. (2003) quote various criteria to be 
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respected when evaluating an LBO target (related to its market, strategic position, 
social situation, organization, products and financial health). Our study examines only 
financial optimal characteristics of LBO targets. A description of financial criteria 
used by LBO firms to evaluate potential targets follows. 
First, one widely accepted conclusion is that the level of financial leverage a firm can 
bear is a function of its business risk. Kale et al. (1991) assert that it is a consensus 
that business risk is one of the primary determinants of a firm‟s debt capacity and 
capital structure. According to this reasoning, firms with high degrees of business risk 
have less capacity to sustain high financial risk, and thus, can use less debt. Firms 
with risky income streams are less able to assume fixed charges in the form of debt 
interest. Johnson (1997) states that firms with more volatile earnings growth may 
experience more states where cash flows are too low for debt service. For this reason, 
LBO firms avoid investments in highly cyclical businesses, stability of earnings and 
cash flow being critical to the success of an LBO.  
H4:  The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be negatively related 
to its level of business risk. 
Second, an LBO target‟s activity must not require heavy investments. In capital 
intensive enterprises relatively large amounts of tangible capital assets are required. 
During the LBO, new investments have to be limited. Consequently, the target‟s 
production equipment has to be adapted, so that the company, after the entry of new 
shareholders, is not obliged to invest massively, which would have the consequence 
of reducing LBO leverage. Moreover, its expected growth has to be positive but not 
too high
3
 because a high rate of growth would create high working capital 
requirements. 
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H5:  The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be negatively related 
to its industry capital intensity. 
Third, its profitability ought to be historically high and well controlled with, possibly, 
sources of improvement
4
. 
H6:   The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be positively related 
to its recurring profitability. 
Fourth, its financial structure should be characterized by a shareholders‟ equity (net 
worth) close to the transaction price, a significant amount of distributable reserves, 
and a limited long- and medium-term debt. The distributable reserves can be used 
through an exceptional dividends distribution just after the acquisition of the target by 
the holding company in order to reduce its borrowing. Moreover, a high borrowing 
capacity will be a key factor in the successful set up of the financial structure of the 
LBO (Desbrières et Schatt, 2002a).  
H7: The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be negatively related 
to its financial leverage. 
H8: The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be positively related 
to its amount of distributable reserves. 
Fifth, assets composition should be characterized by modern production equipment, 
requiring few investments, limited working capital requirements, a positive cash 
position, and an important amount of tangible assets. Firms with substantial tangible 
assets are favored since they give creditors better guarantees in the event of failure. 
Non-strategic assets, easily transferable in case of financial difficulty, also increase a 
firm‟s attraction to carry out an LBO.  
H9:  The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be positively related 
to its cash position. 
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H10:  The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be negatively 
related to its level of working capital requirements. 
H11:  The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be positively related 
to its amount of transferable assets. 
H12: The likelihood that a firm becomes an LBO target should be negatively to its 
age of assets. 
Subdividing the LBO sample according to the respective transaction form may also be 
beneficial. As a matter of fact, there are three types of sources for LBOs : family 
businesses succession, divestiture of subsidiaries from groups and exits by venture 
capitalists (sometimes after a first LBO). In the former case, LBOs are a means to 
hand on small and medium companies, i.e. family-run firms (among which some are 
in financial distress or in receivership), above all when there is no family successor. In 
the second case, LBOs are a means of divesting subsidiaries controlled by industrial 
and commercial groups. This distinction allows us to create three sub-samples 
according to the vendor type : family or individual (I), group (G), venture capitalist 
(F). 
Agency costs should be higher in subsidiaries since the firm could be more diffused in 
ownership than a family-run firm. As a consequence, the variables related to Jensen‟s 
argument (FCF divided by sales and turnover growth) are expected to have a greater 
importance in the subsidiaries‟ sub-sample. On the contrary, family or more generally 
independant firms, and those with a venture capitalist in their capital shoud face less 
agency costs because of the concentration of ownership in the first ones and because 
of the active monitoring introduced by venture capitalists in the second ones.  
Moreover, sources of improvement should be greater in subsidiaries because groups 
usually decide to divest non strategic (non core) and/or less profitable businesses. In a 
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multidivisional firm or in a group structure, organisational problems are frequently 
encountered. They are related to internal capital or labour markets failures and the 
developement of deviant behaviour in contractual relations between shareholders, 
CEOs, divisional managers, employees (Desbrières and Schatt, 2002a). Consequently, 
former subsidiaries and divisions could exhibit prior to the deal a less favourable 
financial profile from the LBO firms‟ viewpoint but these financial weaknesses are 
expected to disappear after the LBO since divestments should lead to positive 
consequences (increase in profitability if new managers adopt more efficient control 
systems (Hite and Vetsuypens, 1989) and carry out investments that create more value 
(Denis, 1992)). For this type of targets, LBO firms should take into account in their 
acquisition rationale the future of the company (sources of improvement) and not only 
the past accounting data.  
We also propose distinguishing between LBOs according to the bidder type : 
management or investors. This enables us to create two other sub-samples : MBOs, in 
which the management holds the majority of the holding‟s shares and IBOs, in which 
LBO firms lead the transaction. This distinction should be significant and beneficial 
for our analysis because the deal objectives are different according to the bidder type. 
The former is used to perpetuate the firm after the founder‟s retirement, sometimes as 
an alternative to a sale to a competitor. The latter is used with a more financial 
objective. LBO firms plan their exit strategy as soon as they enter the capital and they 
seek to maximize their gains. Consequently, we expect LBO firms to be more careful 
in their acquisition rationale when they are leaders on a transaction. On the contrary, 
companies that do not fill all the LBO firms‟ financial criteria could nevertheless 
undergo MBOs because they are a means to transfer companies when there is no other 
candidate or solution. 
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Based on the above discussion, we develop the following complementary hypotheses 
for our sub-samples : 
H13: The impact of free cash flow variables on the likelihood of an LBO transaction 
should be more perceptible in the groups subsidiaries sub-sample than in the 
other ones. 
H14:  Groups subsidiaries are expected to exhibit a less favourable financial profile 
prior to the deal. 
H15:  LBO firms‟ financial criteria should have a greater impact on the likelihood 
that a company becomes an LBO target in the IBO sub-sample than in the 
MBO one. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
(i) Sample Selection and Data Sources 
The list of deals is collected from the Zephyr database of the BvD Suite for mid-1997 
to mid-2002, and from the French review Capital Finance for the first semester 1997 
and for the year 1996. In order to assess the financial characteristics of LBO target 
firms before the deal, we require each firm to have financial data available for the four 
years preceding the deals. This restriction on data availability reduces the sample 
from more than 500 deals between 1996 and 2002 to 175 deals between 1996 and 
2002. Table 1 gives the distribution of these deals by year and by industrial sector. 
Although no significant difference in the industrial distributions between our sample 
and the French economy appears
5
, we can see that some sectors are overrepresented 
(textile, clothes and furs, leather and shoes, chemistry) and others underrepresented 
(car retail and reparation, land transports and in a least extent hotels and restaurants). 
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A brief look at these industrial sectors didn‟t reveal any salient performance 
characteristics
6
.  
We also divide our sample into several sub-samples according to the vendor (or 
target) type and according to the bidder type
7
. First, we distinguish between transfers 
of independent firms (58 observations), divestments from groups (61 observations) 
and exits by venture capitalists (23 observations). Second, we distinguish between 
MBOs (72 observations), IBOs (84 observations) and MBIs (7 observations).  
 
(ii) Methodology 
In order to assess the financial characteristics of LBO target firms, we compare our 
sample of LBO firms to a control sample. Each LBO company is paired with a similar 
non-LBO company. The non-LBO (paired) company has: 1) the same activity as the 
LBO company at the NAF 4-digit level and 2) the turnover the closest to those of the 
LBO company at the end of the fiscal year preceding the deal. All the variables were 
extracted from Diane database. In the following tables, we report only variables that 
are computed on the three years before the deal. 
Our variables definitions are presented in table 2. However several variables deserve 
further explanations. 
FCF (H1) 
For hypothesis H1 a proxy for the company‟s FCF is needed. We use the same 
definition of FCF as Lehn and Poulsen (1989). FCF is measured as the post-tax cash 
flow that is not distributed to security holders as dividends or interest payments. It 
represents the cash flow that is available to the firm to reinvest in its operations. More 
precisely, it is the operating income before taxes and depreciation less taxes paid less 
interest expense less preferred and common dividends
8
. We adjust for firm size by 
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standardizing the FCF estimate by the firm‟s turnover. A similar measure for 
operating FCF is used, among others, by Lang et al. (1991)
9
. 
Growth prospects (H2) 
To proxy for the growth prospects of hypothesis H2, we follow Lehn and Poulsen 
(1989), who use the (average) growth rate of turnover. Since the firms in our sample 
are private, we cannot use the Tobin‟s q ratio, which is usually used to measure 
growth opportunities. 
Business risk (H4) 
The coefficients of variation of turnover growth, FCF divided by turnover, ROIC and 
ROE are used as different measures of business risk. We estimate the coefficient of 
variation using the previous three years. It is suggested that since the volatility of a 
firm‟s future income is the chief factor in determining a firm‟s ability to meet interest 
charges, earnings and turnover volatility is an indication of business risk (Ferri and 
Jones, 1979). Various measures are used in the literature to measure business risk. For 
instance, Chakraborty et al. (1999) use the coefficient of variation of cash flow as a 
measure of cash flow uncertainty
10
.  
Capital intensity (H5) 
Our proxy of capital intensity is the tangible assets divided by total assets ratio. It 
evaluates the needs for investment in tangible assets.  
Distributable reserves (H8) 
The retained earnings divided by total assets ratio is a proxy for the amount of 
distributable reserves. 
Transferable assets (H11) 
We use as a proxy variable for the presence of transferable assets in the target‟s 
balance sheet tangible assets (divided by total assets) and financial assets (divided by 
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total assets). The justification for this is that financial assets should be easily 
transferable in case of difficulty since they are not used directly for the operations. 
Tangible assets are also used as a proxy for transferable assets because if a large 
volume of assets is tangible then it gives target‟s creditors better guarantees as it can 
be sold in the event of failure.  
Age of assets (H12) 
We use the Total Assets (net)/Total assets (gross) ratio to evaluate the age of assets. 
Table 3 summarizes the LBO likelihood hypotheses developed, the proxy variables 
used within the empirical tests, and the expected sign for each variable. A positive 
expected sign implies that an increase in the corresponding variable increases the 
likelihood of a forthcoming LBO transaction. 
Two types of tests are conducted: first univariate and then multivariate. Although this 
study focuses primarily on the multivariate analysis of the financial determinants of 
LBO likelihood, we also report univariate descriptive statistics. Whereas multivariate 
analysis controls for the interactions between the explanatory variables, univariate 
descriptive statistics consider each variable separately.  
Thus, in a first step, we conduct tests of differences between LBO and control 
companies for all our financial variables, for the three years preceding the deal and for 
the mean of this three-year period. The main objective of the univariate descriptive 
statistics is to identify the salient financial characteristics of LBO target companies 
compared to non-LBO companies. As it can be seen in table 4, sample means for our 
variables show extreme values. Consequently, we rely on the median Wilcoxon tests 
when interpreting the results. These tests were conducted in a « static »way, simply 
by analysing the differences between our samples for each variable each year, and in a 
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« dynamic » way by computing the differences between the changes in our variables 
between a year and the following year.  
In a second step, the multivariate analysis attempts to distinguish among a sample of 
companies those, which will be subject to an LBO transaction on the basis of a 
functional relationship between a firm‟s financial characteristics and its LBO 
likelihood in a given period (year n). Thus, the main objective is to classify the 
company being considered either as an LBO candidate or a non-LBO candidate. As 
our dependant variable is an ordinal one (1 if a company is an LBO target, 0 if it is 
non-LBO), we use a logistic regression to evaluate variables that significantly 
influence LBO likelihood. In related areas, Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Powell 
(1997) among others employ the concept of the multivariate logit probability models. 
Our hypotheses address financial and operating factors as potential distinguishing 
characteristics in our analysis of firms, which undergo an LBO. Identifying features of 
firms, which undergo LBO from other firms in their respective industries, are ex ante 
FCF factors, taxation factors and operating and financial factors. The model takes the 
form: 
P (LBOn) = F (FCF factors, taxation factors, operating and financial factors, error) 
where LBOn is a qualitative dependent variable, taking the value one if the firm 
undergoes an LBO in the accounting year n, and zero if the company is not taken 
over.  
We construct our logit model by adding twelve variables. In order to avoid 
correlations between variables, we retain the coefficient of variation of ROIC as the 
only measure of business risk and ROE as our only measure of profitability. However 
some of our variables being quite close (in the way they are computed), we also look 
at the correlations between variables to avoid multicollinearity problem in our model 
 16 
estimations. We find that all the correlations between our variables are relatively 
moderate. Moreover, we ran several regressions putting different variables in and out 
of the model and the coefficients did not seem to be affected. Finally, we don‟t face 
the classical symptom of multicollinearity (big R-squared but small z-statistics). 
Consequently, we conclude that multicollinearity should not be a problem in our 
study. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
(i) Results from Univariate Analysis 
Let‟s remind that, considering the special features of our variables (see section 3), we 
base our interpretation on the median (Wilcoxon) tests. Table 4 presents the results of 
the univariate analysis for the LBO versus non-LBO sample. In addition to the sample 
medians for each proxy variable, the table reports the tests of (static) differences 
between the LBO target companies and the non-LBO companies for the average 
variables on the 3 year-period preceding the deal. We also ran the tests on each of the 
3 years preceding the deal. There were some statistically significant differences 
between LBO and non-LBO firms on our variables for these years but it could be that 
some of these results were a consequence, not a cause of the LBO: firms anticipating 
the deal would try to show the best picture. As a result, it is important to check if 
these features are stable over time. That's why results for each year are not reported, 
but just quoted if necessary. 
Prior to the deal, LBO target companies present several features compared to non-
LBO companies: they are less leveraged and they have more financial assets. They 
also outperform their industry counterparts with regard to performance ratios (ROIC 
and ROE) and cash generation capacity (only for the year n-1). This outperformance 
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results in higher income tax expense level. Our results are consistent with those of 
Desbrières and Schatt (2002a) on the French market. The authors show that return on 
equity is higher for LBO targets two years before the deal, and that return on 
investment is greater two years before and the year preceding the deal. In their study, 
LBO targets also appear significantly less indebted than their counterparts. Although 
they measure liquidity and cash flows variables in a different way, they also show that 
LBO targets have larger FCF and more liquid assets before the deal. Our 
supplementary variables complete the picture, showing that LBO targets‟ working 
capital requirements level are statistically higher than those of other firms (similar to 
Desbrières et Schatt, 2002b). Other assets characteristics are quite similar for sample 
firms and control group as their fixed assets characteristics (estimated age, level, 
depreciation politics) and their available funds are very similar to those of non-LBO 
companies.  
Based on these results, LBO targets appear to be more efficient companies compared 
to their counterparts, which use this performance to lower their leverage and invest in 
financial medium- and long-term financial assets instead of investing in their internal 
growth. It could also be that a high level of liquid (financial) assets and a low level of 
debt compensate for the unexpected risky profile of LBO targets. 
Indeed, in contradiction with our expectation (hypothesis H4), business risk is not 
lower for LBO targets than for other firms. On the contrary, our results show a larger 
variability of ROIC and ROE for LBO targets than for non-LBO on the 3 years 
preceding the deal.  
As we have already stated, LBO targets don't seem to be overrepresented in specific 
industrial sectors. Moreover, the coefficient of variation of turnover growth is not 
higher for LBO than for non-LBO targets. Hence, it seems that the risky profile of 
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LBO targets doesn't derive from a higher risk in the product market of LBO targets. 
This risk is rather a consequence of business characteristics
11
 of LBO firms. 
This analysis allows us to turn to temporary conclusions regarding our hypotheses. 
Our evidence clearly supports hypotheses concerning profitability, taxation and 
capital structure. LBO companies outperform (H6 corroborated) and they are less 
indebted (H7 corroborated) than their counterparts. Altogether, this evidence certainly 
explains the high income tax expense they bear (H3 corroborated). Evidence that 
LBO targets have a high level of financial assets in their assets structure also supports 
our hypothesis H11 (assets composition) and in a sense hypothesis H9 (target‟s ex 
ante cash position) as financial assets are easily transferable. However, contrary to 
hypothesis H10, we find that LBO targets face higher levels of working capital 
requirements than their industry counterparts. 
Other hypotheses don‟t receive clear support. Jensen‟s hypothesis is not corroborated. 
Ex-ante level of FCF is significantly higher only the year preceding the deal, not on a 
long time-frame (H1). There is no evidence that the targets‟ growth opportunities are 
weaker than for their counterparts (H2). The targets‟ propensity to invest in financial 
assets can be seen as evidence that these firms don‟t have any internal or business 
growth opportunities. But we can also reverse the analysis: a good economic 
performance, coupled with these high financial investments, could reveal that target 
firms don‟t jump at internal growth opportunities and voluntary limit their business 
growth
12
. This voluntary limited growth could also be consistent as a mean of limiting 
default risk. Since LBO targets are more risky (economically), they could prefer not 
to be too leveraged and to possess more liquid or transferable (financial) assets.  
Finally, evidence allows us to reject some hypotheses. The age of assets (H12), which 
can be estimated by the net to gross book value of fixed assets (TA/TAg), as well as 
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other variables regarding fixed (tangible and intangible) assets, are very similar for 
LBO and non-LBO companies. This result differs somewhat with those of Desbrières 
and Schatt (2002b). The amount of distributable reserves is also not significant (H8). 
The low business risk hypothesis (H4) is rejected: profitability seems to be more 
volatile for LBO targets than for their rivals. 
To conclude the first part of our analysis for the total sample, we can notice that some 
of our results are unstable and astonishing. FCF levels are positively significant only 
the year preceding the deal (not reported), but not in average 3 years before. To study 
these facts thoroughly, we examine if some trends in the variables appear before the 
deal. More precisely, we look at the changes in the variables between a year and the 
following year in order to see if there are significant, consistent, changes before the 
deal. Our results (not reported) show few significant variations of our variables. 
Moreover, we can‟t draw any consistent explanation from the significant variations. 
For example, the only significant (at a 90% confidence level) variations in our 
variables between n-2 and n-1 (where n is the deal's year) are the FCF and leverage 
variables. LBO targets increase their FCF and decrease their indebtedness 
significantly more than other firms the year preceding the deal. But significant 
variations appear neither between n-3 and n-2 nor between n-3 and n-1. In fact, these 
results do not permit to go deeper in our analysis on the total sample. Nevertheless, 
we can go deeper by studying differences between sub-samples. We first analyse the 
three sub-samples according to the vendor type: family or individual (58 LBOs), 
group (61 LBOs) and venture capitalist (23 LBOs). 
Independent LBO targets present very marked features (table 5). They outperform 
their industry counterparts in terms of growth, profitability and capacity to generate 
cash prior to the deal. However this greater performance goes with a higher level of 
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business risk. They also have significantly less debt and tangible assets and more 
financial assets in their balance sheets. The age of assets seems to be lower for LBO 
targets in this sub-sample. These are economically risky but effective targets. 
Actually, independent targets before the deal are consistent with the predictions of our 
hypotheses, except for the business risk, which is higher, and the working capital 
requirements, which are not statistically different from other firms. 
By contrast, former subsidiaries show fewer differences, sometimes with an opposite 
sign, in comparison with other firms (table 6). Former subsidiaries from groups do not 
exhibit a greater performance prior to the transaction. On the contrary, their financial 
performance is significantly lower than their counterparts‟ one but it is also less 
volatile. Several assets characteristics are statistically different in this sub-sample. 
Levels of working capital requirements and financial assets in total assets are higher 
for this type of LBO targets. Assets seem to be older for former subsidiaries that 
undertake an LBO than for the control sample. These results corroborate our 
hypothesis H14.  
The results for the third sub-sample of this first classification are not reported. With a 
limited size of 23 deals, we find that only two variables are statistically different 
between LBO targets that had a venture capitalist in their capital and their control 
sample. LBOs have a higher financial performance (ROE) and more financial assets 
than other firms.  
In fact, two sub-samples show very distinctive features. Targets from previously 
independent firms are really efficient (in terms of performance ratios, FCF, age of 
assets) with a risky income stream. They are also less leveraged than their 
counterparts and possess more financial and other transferable assets. These last 
features could compensate for their risk. By contrast, former subsidiaries are not 
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efficient (older assets) and not less indebted but they are less risky (in terms of cash-
flows volatility) prior to the deal. They also have more financial assets than their 
counterparts but it certainly refers to their former path of growth and group affiliation 
rather than to a limitation of default risk.  
We also observe differences when constructing sub-samples according to the bidder 
type but the features of each sub-sample (Management Buy-Out vs. Investor Buy-
Out) are somewhat less pronounced. 
MBO targets are not more profitable than their counterparts but they exhibit a higher 
level of taxes. They have less debt and cash whereas they have more financial assets 
and working capital requirements (table 7). 
When the main bidder is a LBO firm (not a manager), we only observe higher 
working capital requirements and financial assets in the LBO targets‟ balance sheets, 
but no other financial criterion is statistically different (table 8). These results run 
against our expectations as we expected financial bidders to follow more closely 
financial criteria in their targets‟ acquisition rationale. The most striking fact is that 
when bidders are investors, the target possesses about 7 times more financial assets 
than other firms. 
To conclude this section, sub-samples show clear differences. But these features don't 
directly and clearly support one explanation (FCF, tax, other rational) for the LBO 
activity. They rather draw different pictures of LBO targets, depending on the vendor 
and the bidder type. 
The most striking sub-sample is the Independent targets one. These targets exhibit a 
higher turnover growth. They are also really efficient (whatever the measure used), 
riskier (whatever the measure used), they have a bit more financial assets, less 
tangible assets and these assets are younger than for other firms. Finally, they pay 
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more taxes (compared to turnover) than their counterparts. Together, these features 
draw a picture of small firms, with good growth opportunities, but too small to 
optimize their fiscal management. In these firms, the tax saving hypothesis could be a 
valid motive for the deal. The free cash flows story is harder to support since the 
agency costs prior to the deal are probably limited (the manager is the owner) and the 
growth opportunities are quite good so that negative NPV projects are scarce. Other 
features of these firms are consistent with the LBO firms‟ acquisition rationale, except 
their risky profile, which could be compensated by a low indebtedness and a quite 
high level of financial assets. This sub-sample contrasts very sharply with the targets 
from groups. The features of targets from groups show them as non-core or less 
profitable business units from groups, which are divested. Indeed these targets are low 
performers (with a low risk, which in turn depicts these firms as lacking of dynamics), 
with old assets, and important working capital requirements to finance, corroborating 
H14. These firms possess more financial assets than other firms. In fact, the motive 
for the bidder when acquiring this kind of targets is probably the sources of 
improvement that lie in these firms, and the transferable (financial) assets. Agency 
costs are probably higher in these firms. Our free cash flows variable is not sufficient 
to show it, but doesn‟t dismiss it. The low ROE can be a sign of past low (or even 
negative) NPV investments
13
.  
The pictures are less clear when we analyse sub-samples according to the bidder type. 
It seems that managers acquire their company
14
 when it pays more taxes, is less 
indebted and has more working capital requirements (WCR) and financial assets. In 
fact, it seems that the targets‟ potential liquidity of assets (through transferability of 
financial assets, improvement in WCR management, and the fiscal deductibility of 
debt‟s interests) and indebtedness capacity (due to a low leverage) are the main 
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motives for these bidders. Motives for the IBO cases, where bidders are investors (not 
managers) are perhaps similar but less clear. In fact, these bidders undergo deals on 
firms with only two features similar to the formers: high WCR and financial assets to 
total assets ratio. But these firms are not less indebted that other non-LBO target 
companies. 
Multivariate models, explaining the likelihood of an LBO deal by the target‟s 
financial characteristics, complement our analysis of LBO motives. 
 
(ii) Results from Multivariate Analysis 
Since the preceding (univariate) analysis considered each proxy variable 
independently, the coefficients might loose reliability in determining the variable‟s 
significance in the presence of other variables. Therefore, multivariate analysis is 
employed to estimate the common effects on the LBO likelihood. Based upon the 
earlier discussion there is strong evidence that the effects of some variables on a 
company‟s decision to undergo an LBO depend upon the levels of other proxy 
variables.  
The results of the multivariate analysis are reported in Table 9. All models 
incorporate the average values of variables measured the three years preceding the 
LBO. Model I includes the total sample whereas models II, III, IV and V are 
estimated on our different sub-samples. The relatively weak correlations among our 
explanatory variables should evacuate any multicollinearity problem. 
Table 9 gives several indicators of the model goodness-of-fit. The highest Mc Fadden 
R-squared is 21,06%. It is obtained with the logistic regression estimated on the 
independant targets sub-sample. This result indicates that the variables retained in the 
regression can explain 21,06% of the probability of undergoing an LBO for 
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independant companies. Although the McFadden R
2
 likelihood ratio index is 
important, the main criteria for the model selection are the AIC criterion and the 
Schwarz criterion. In general, one judges a model with a lower value of the criterion 
to be preferable to alternative models
15
. 
All five models are significant at the 10% level which means that the variables 
retained in the five regressions bring a significant quantity of information to explain 
the probability of occurrence of an LBO.  
According to the results for Model I, the only significant variable predicting the 
likelihood of LBO is Financial assets to total assets. This result shows that LBO 
targets are more likely to have financial assets in their balance sheet, which is 
consistent with hypothesis H11 since financial assets are easily transferable assets 
(p<0,001 in Model I). It also proves that LBO targets manage a pronounced external 
growth policy. But as previously shown, the common sample conceals different 
companies and motives. Consequently, we have to refer to the model run for each 
sub-sample to assess the motives of the deals.  
Model II, run on the independent sub-sample (firms which were independent, often 
family owned prior to the deal) shows that for these performing, with young assets 
and high growth opportunities firms, only the Tax variable impacts positively the 
likelihood of being acquired through an LBO. It seems that the tax savings hypothesis 
is the main motive. In fact, as previously noticed, this type of companies are often 
small family owned businesses for which there is no family successor. As a 
consequence, the main motive for the LBO transaction on these companies is not 
directly the fiscal one. But as they are small and very efficient, they can‟t completely 
optimize their fiscal management and have to pay income taxes. That‟s probably why 
the fiscal variable appears to be significant. 
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Model III, run on the targets from groups, shows a different picture and motive. The 
likelihood that a subsidiary is divested through an LBO is a positive function of its 
part of financial assets in the total assets, and a negative function of the age of its 
(tangible) assets. It means that the more the target offers some transferable (financial) 
assets, the more it can be divested through an LBO. The more the assets are old, 
depicting a non-core subsidiary in a group, the more the subsidiary will be divested 
through an LBO. We can‟t corroborate our hypothesis H13, which stated that the 
impact of free cash flow variables (and free cash flows problems) on the likelihood of 
an LBO transaction should be greater in the case of group subsidiaries. Nevertheless, 
some signs show that these targets suffer from management problems, which can be 
stated as reflecting agency problems prior to the deal: their assets are older and less 
(financially) profitable.  
Model IV is run on the targets, which were bought by the incumbent management 
prior to the deal. As we can see, the likelihood of such a deal evolves positively with 
the tax variable and negatively with the net cash variable. In these targets, with a low 
debt level and a high transferability of assets, it is clear that the tax saving hypothesis 
can be a valid motive for LBO. Hence, managers use their company‟s borrowing 
capacity to make the most of the related tax savings. The reason why the net cash 
position has a negative impact on the likelihood of LBO is less clear and quite 
difficult to analyse. 
Finally, model V, run on the Investor-led Buy-outs, shows that, contrary to our 
hypothesis H15, financial criteria have less impact on the likelihood that a company 
undergoes an LBO. The only criterion, which is significant, is the financial to total 
assets ratio. LBO firms when they are leaders on a transaction are particularly 
sensitive to the level of financial assets because some of them could be sold after the 
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deal. It could be that LBO firms in IBOs are only sensitive to transferable assets, or 
more probably, that they are more able to manage the financial assets, resulting from 
investments or firms‟ acquisitions. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
Although several papers have attempted to empirically investigate the financial 
characteristics for companies undergoing LBO transactions within the Anglo-Saxon 
region, the authors have failed to expand their analysis to Continental European 
countries in general, and to France in particular. This gap in the academic literature is 
especially critical for France as recent research undertaken in France (Desbrières and 
Schatt, 2002a, 2002b) provides initial evidence suggesting that the implications of 
French LBOs are very specific (sources, targets‟ ex post performance…). 
To remedy this shortcoming, this study exclusively examined the LBO phenomenon 
for French private companies. Specifically, we attempted to explain the motives for an 
LBO transaction and to empirically examine whether the financial characteristics of 
French LBO targets are distinguishable from firms, which have not undergone an 
LBO.  
The study confirms some expected and beforehand shown features of LBO targets on 
the French market. Hypotheses concerning financial structure and assets composition 
are corroborated. LBO targets are less indebted and possess relatively more liquid 
(financial) assets than their industry counterparts.  
However, some results are consistent neither with our expectations, nor with former 
results. Some differences appear when compared to results obtained by Desbrières 
and Schatt. (2002b) concerning the assets characteristics (age) for example. The 
agency costs of FCF hypothesis to explain French LBOs is not corroborated. More 
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important is the fact that, contrary to common sense and classical postulated 
characteristics of LBO targets, LBOs‟ volatility of economic performance (business 
risk) seems to be higher than for non-LBO firms prior to the deal. This result indicates 
an unexpected risky profile of LBO targets that could be important for further studies.  
Indeed, we show that the previously reported outperformance (ROE and ROIC) 
(Desbrières and Schatt, 2002a) of LBO targets prior to the deal seems to be the price 
for the risk associated. This question is worth studying more deeply. It could help to 
explain some unexpected results previously reported, in particular the 
underperformance puzzle after the deal already emphasized on the French market 
(Desbrières and Schatt, 2002a).  
Subdividing our sample according to the vendor type and bidder type is beneficial for 
our analysis. We thus notice that the so-called outperformance of LBO targets prior to 
the deal hides in fact different cases. According to the LBO type, motives of 
transactions are different. On the one hand, for former independent firms, in which it 
is a matter of succession for relatively small firms with good growth opportunities, the 
tax savings hypothesis is corroborated. On the other hand, in former subsidiaries or 
divisions, it is a matter of divestiture of non-core or non-profitable entities in larger 
groups and the guarantees offered in terms of assets liquidity seem to be the most 
important variable for LBO likelihood.  
In fact, according to the LBO type and motives, hypotheses appear to be more or less 
relevant and corroborated. In particular, regarding our results for the different sub-
samples, we clearly distinguish between LBOs according to the vendor type 
(independent vs. groups) whereas it seems less clear that our distinction between 
MBOs and IBOs reveals different financial profiles for LBO targets. 
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NOTES 
1
 These include a lack of clarity and the significance of the offer reaching a 95 per cent 
acceptance level, which is necessary for both tax integration and to initiate the squeeze-out 
provisions. In 2002, the LBO Commission of AFIC, the French Venture Capital Association, 
published a white paper that highlighted the need to improve French law in the area of PTPs. 
2
 FCF is « cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net 
present values » (Jensen, 1986, p. 323). 
3
 However we can‟t test this hypothesis since the LBO targets in our sample are private and 
we can not use Tobin‟s q to evaluate targets‟ expected growth. 
4
 Sources of improvement in profitability can‟t be easily evaluated with our accounting data. 
5
 The industrial distribution of French firms is proxied by the distribution of 63 712 firms for 
which accounts are available on the period studied (1996-2002) in the Diane database. A 
Student test and a Wilcoxon test show no significant difference at a 90% confidence level. 
6
 For example, it emerges that the median value of the economic performance for the French 
economy (0.22) is very close to those of the over represented sectors (textile (0.17); clothes 
and furs (0.24); leather and shoes (0.21); chemistry (0.21)) and those of the underrepresented 
sectors (cars retail and reparation (0.20); road transports (0.16)). 
7
 The vendor name and the bidder name are not available in Capital Finance and Zephyr for 
all the targets in our sample. Consequently, we are not able to classify all the deals in our 
sample. 
8
 We acknowledge that this definition may be imperfect for small companies because 
dividend payments are decided upon by the management.  
9
 However Lang et al. (1991) adjust for firm size by standardizing the FCF estimate by the 
firm‟s book value of total assets. 
10
 We have to acknowledge that our measures of risk, namely, the coefficients of variation of 
turnover growth, ROIC, ROE and FCF/turnover will indicate a high level of risk for an 
enterprise experiencing a steady and high rate of growth. 
11
 Our results seem to show that LBO targets have more fixed costs and a higher operating 
leverage than non-LBO firms. 
12
 Desbrières and Schatt‟s study (2002b) seems to indicate that there is no significant increase 
in tangible and intangible assets after the deal. Desbrières and Schatt only observe an ex-post 
increase in the target‟s turnover. These results run against this explanation. 
13
 Of course, it doesn‟t mean that negative NPV projects and low ROE are synonyms. 
14
 We exclude MBIs (Management Buy-Ins) from our sub-sample. So the 72 MBOs are deals 
in which the incumbent management prior to the deal acquires a large part of the target‟s 
capital and leads the operation. 
15
 The AIC and the Schwarz criteria are effective estimates of the out-of sample forecast error 
variance. Depending on the specific form of the penalty factor, each criterion embodies its 
own trade-off between the fit (average residual sum of squares divided by the number of 
regressors) and the penalty factor (degrees of freedom). In contrast to R
2
, both criteria 
penalize the degrees of freedom more harshly. Although AIC and Schwarz should obtain their 
minimum at the same model, the Schwarz criterion has an extremely strong taste for simple 
models. 
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Table 1 
Sample sectorial structure 
 Deal year    
NAF code name (2 digits) 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2000+ 
2001* 
Total 
number 
% 
sample 
% 
Diane 
Agriculture, hunting, related services  2  2     4 1,14 0,91 
Food industries  6  2 2 4  2  16 4,57 2,68 
Textile industry  6   2 4 6   18 5,14 0,79 
Clothing and furs industry 2 4  4  2   12 3,43 0,65 
Leather and shoes industry 2  2      4 1,14 0,22 
Wood work and manufacture of wooden 
articles 
 2    2   4 1,14 1,15 
Paper and cardboard industry  2  2  2   6 1,71 0,47 
Edition, printing works, reproduction 2 6 2 4   2  16 4,57 1,82 
Coking, refining, nuclear industries      2   2 0,57 0,05 
Chemical industry  4 4 8  2 6 2  26 7,43 0,99 
Rubber and plastics industry 2 4 6 2 2 2   18 5,14 1,27 
Manufacture of other nonmetal mineral 
products 
  2      2 0,57 0,87 
Metallurgy    2    2   4 1,14 0,33 
Metals work  6 2 2   2   12 3,43 4,60 
Manufacture of machines and equipment 4 2 2  8 2  4 22 6,29 2,29 
Manufacture of electrical machines and 
device 
    6 2   8 2,29 0,69 
Manufacture of radio, television and 
communication equipment 
    2  2  4 1,14 0,44 
Manufacture of medical, precision, 
optics and clock industry instruments 
  2  4 2   8 2,29 0,85 
Manufacture of other transport 
equipment 
 2       2 0,57 0,27 
Manufacture of furniture ; various 
industries 
2 4   2 4   12 3,43 0,92 
Construction business     6  4 2  12 3,43 11,90 
Wholesale and trade intermediaries 8 6 14 6 14 8 2  58 16,57 17,92 
Retail trade and domestic articles repair 2  2 2 6 4   16 4,57 9,77 
Hotels and restaurants      2    2 0,57 2,47 
Land transports    2      2 0,57 3,67 
Transport auxiliary services     6 2   8 2,29 1,58 
Financial intermediation   2       2 0,57 0,23 
Real-estate activities    2 4 2 4   12 3,43 2,60 
Hiring without operator   4  2 2 2   10 2,86 0,59 
Computers activities      4    4 1,14 1,42 
Research and development  2    2   4 1,14 0,11 
Services provided mainly to companies  2 4 4  4   14 4,00 14,62 
Education      2     2 0,57 0,28 
Entertainment, culture and sport 
activities 
 2  2     4 1,14 0,96 
Total   46 54 52 46 70 66 12 4* 350 100,00 90,41** 
* The company « De Dietrich et cie » was a target in 2000 and in 2001. 
** The total for Diane database is less than 1 because our LBOs‟ sample doesn‟t include all the industrial sectors of 
Diane database. 
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Table 2 
Proxy Variables Definitions 
Proxy 
variables 
Definitions 
FCF/TR “Free cash flows” (1) divided by turnover 
TRGR Turnover growth 
Tax/TR Income tax divided by turnover 
CVTRGR Coefficient of variation of turnover growth computed on the 3 year-
period preceding the deal 
CVROIC Coefficient of variation of ROIC computed on the 3 year-period 
preceding the deal 
CVROE Coefficient of variation of ROE computed on the 3 year-period 
preceding the deal 
CVFCF/TR Coefficient of variation of FCF/turnover computed on the 3 year-
period preceding the deal 
TanA/TA Tangible assets (net) divided by total assets (net) 
ROIC Return On Invested Capital = (operating income before taxes + 
interest expenses) divided by “economic assets” (WCR + fixed 
Assets (net)) 
ROE Return On Equity = Net income divided by (stockholders equity - net 
income) 
LEV Total debt divided by stockholders equity 
RET/TA  Retained earnings/Total assets 
NC/TA  Net cash/Total assets 
WCR/TR Working Capital Requirement divided by turnover 
FA/TA Financial assets (net)/Total Assets (net) 
TA/TAg Total Assets (net)/Total assets (gross) 
(1) Free Cash Flows = operating income before taxes and depreciation less taxes paid less interest 
expense less preferred and common dividends. 
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Table 3 
Summary of hypotheses 
Theory Hypothesis Proxies Abbreviation Expected 
sign 
Agency cost 
of free cash 
flow 
H 1 
 
 
H 2 
Free cash flow to 
turnover 
 
Turnover growth rate 
FCF/TR 
 
 
TRGR 
+ 
 
 
- 
 
Taxation 
 
 
H 3 
 
Income tax to turnover 
 
Tax/TR 
 
+ 
 
Business risk 
H 4 Coefficients of variation 
of turnover growth, 
ROIC, ROE and FCF/TR  
CVTRGR, 
CVROIC, 
CVROE, 
CVFCF/TR 
 
- 
Capital 
intensity 
H 5 Tangible assets to total 
assets 
TanA/TA - 
 
Profitability 
H 6 Return on Invested 
Capital and Return on 
Equity 
 
ROIC, ROE 
 
+ 
 
Financial 
structure 
H 7 
 
H 8 
Total debt to equity 
 
Retained earnings to total 
assets 
LEV 
 
RET/TA 
- 
 
+ 
 
 
 
Assets 
composition 
H 9 
 
H 10 
 
 
H 11 
 
 
H 12 
Net cash to total assets 
 
Working capital 
requirement to turnover 
 
Financial assets to total 
assets 
 
Total assets (net) to total 
assets (gross) 
NC/TA 
 
WCR/TR 
 
 
FA/TA 
 
 
TA/TAg 
+ 
 
- 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
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Table 4 
Tests of differences between LBO companies and control sample, averages 3 years before the deal (175 LBO) 
 Proxies LBO companies Non-LBO companies  
  
mean 
standard 
deviation 
median mean 
standard 
deviation 
median 
Centered T+ 
Wilcoxon 
A
ct
iv
it
y
 a
n
d
 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 FCF/TR -0,0664 0,9932 0,0601 0,0559 0,1244 0,0383 1,3022 
TRGR 4,2129 35,5444 0,1886 0,6039 2,6387 0,1721 0,6794 
Tax/TR -0,0217 0,4807 0,0213 0,0156 0,0307 0,0069 3,9305*** 
ROIC -0,2558 7,7837 0,2959 -0,0984 3,2288 0,1843 2,1977* 
ROE 0,2840 1,4458 0,1734 0,4158 2,0625 0,1299 2,0070* 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
ri
sk
 
CVTRGR 601,0220 7662,1496 0,0098 3,4258 33,1464 0,0124 0,4991 
CVROIC -85,4735 902,6398 0,0292 -13,8260 131,3404 0,0103 1,6479
†
 
CVROE 1,6432 24,6663 0,0137 5,2919 52,4842 0,0055 1,9638* 
CVFCF/TR -1,0936 12,8340 0,0007 -0,0002 0,0146 0,0005 1,2814 
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
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 a
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d
 
fi
n
an
ci
al
 s
tr
u
ct
u
re
 TanA/TA 0,1470 0,1512 0,0961 0,1521 0,1518 0,1190 -0,7071 
LEV  4,1782 27,9611 1,3202 25,4359 267,0855 1,9524 -2,2350* 
RET/TA 0,1380 0,1541 0,0797 0,1324 0,1658 0,0616 0,7265 
NC/TA 0,0913 0,1415 0,0564 0,1044 0,2076 0,0443 -0,3680 
WCR/TR 0,6933 5,9263 0,1419 0,1117 0,5297 0,0996 3,7532*** 
FA/TA 0,1192 0,1875 0,0375 0,0490 0,0904 0,0150 4,4714*** 
TA/TAg 0,1415 0,1391 0,8174 0,2076 0,1317 0,8162 0,5870 
Notes: 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample of 175 French LBO targets and the control sample of 175 French companies that did not undergo an LBO during the 
period 1996 to 2002. For all proxies described in table 2, mean, standard deviation and median of averages on the n-3/n-1 period (n is the deal‟s year) are reported and an 
univariate test for the difference in medians between the two samples is conducted. Here, the median difference is defined as the value for the LBO companies minus the 
values for the non-LBO companies. Thus, a significantly positive (negative) T-statistic implies that the median of the LBO sample is larger (smaller) than the median of the 
non-LBO sample. ***, **, * and 
† 
indicate statistical significance at the 0,1%, 1% and 5% and 10% level, respectively. Differences for variables in bold characters are 
significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5 
Tests of differences between Independent targets and control sample, averages 3 years before the deal (58 
LBOs) 
Average 
(N-3)/(N-1) 
Variables 
Median LBO 
companies 
Median non-
LBO companies 
Centered T+ 
Wilcoxon 
A
ct
iv
it
y
 a
n
d
 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 FCF/TR 0,0885 0,0333 2,5898** 
TRGR 0,1713 0,1038 2,1098* 
Tax/TR 0,0326 0,0041 4,3241*** 
ROIC 0,4089 0,2077 2,5201* 
ROE 0,2470 0,1405 2,6363** 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
ri
sk
 
CVTRGR 0,0124 0,0061 1,8233
†
 
CVROIC 0,0479 0,0110 2,2492* 
CVROE 0,0221 0,0046 2,5511* 
CVFCF/TR 0,0010 0,0004 2,1950* 
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s 
o
f 
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n
d
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 
TanA/TA 0,0784 0,1315 -2,2027* 
LEV 1,2457 2,0403 -2,2569* 
RET/TA 0,1654 0,0529 1,6298 
NC/TA 0,0669 0,0394 0,3987 
WCR/TR 0,1415 0,1185 1,622 
FA/TA 0,0257 0,0162 2,1717* 
TA/TAg 0,8672 0,8107 2,4117* 
Differences for variables in bold characters are significant at the 10 % level. 
 
Table 6 
Tests of differences between Groups targets and control sample, averages 3 years before the deal (61 
LBOs) 
Average 
(N-3)/(N-1) 
Variables Median LBO 
Median non 
LBO 
Centered T+ 
Wilcoxon 
A
ct
iv
it
y
 a
n
d
 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
  
FCF/TR 0,0354 0,0380 -1,0307 
TRGR 0,1074 0,2014 -1,0307 
Tax/TR 0,0078 0,0074 0,1903 
ROIC 0,1927 0,1250 0,3699 
ROE 0,1167 0,1299 -2,0938* 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
ri
sk
 
CVTRGR 0,0034 0,0171 -0,7362 
CVROIC 0,0182 0,0058 0,3125 
CVROE 0,0038 0,0079 -1,7131
†
 
CVFCF/TR 0,0004 0,0004 -0,5926 
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 
ch
ar
ac
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ri
st
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o
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d
 f
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u
re
 
TanA/TA 0,1102 0,1045 0,8152 
LEV 1,4745 1,9524 -0,7434 
RET/TA 0,0237 0,0652 -1,487 
NC/TA 0,0289 0,0342 -0,7865 
WCR/TR 0,1602 0,1207 1,8998
†
 
FA/TA 0,0503 0,0130 2,8767** 
TA/TAg 0,7590 0,8077 -2,1369* 
Differences for variables in bold characters are significant at the 10 % level. 
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Table 7 
Tests of differences between MBO targets and control sample, averages 3 years before the deal (72 
MBOs) 
Differences for variables in bold characters are significant at the 10 % level. 
Average 
(N-3)/(N-1) 
Variables Median LBO 
Median non 
LBO 
Centered T+ 
Wilcoxon 
A
ct
iv
it
y
 a
n
d
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 FCF/TR 0,0524 0,0377 0,8249 
TRGR 0,1166 0,1727 -0,7071 
Tax/TR 0,0199 0,0072 3,541*** 
ROIC 0,2374 0,1599 1,2795 
ROE 0,1681 0,1135 1,6554
†
 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
ri
sk
 
CVTRGR 0,0061 0,0103 -0,6061 
CVROIC 0,0199 0,0100 0,7464 
CVROE 0,0132 0,0053 1,5208 
CVFCF/TR 0,0007 0,0005 0,6902 
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 c
h
ar
ac
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ri
st
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o
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n
d
 f
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 s
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u
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u
re
 
TanA/TA 0,0853 0,1026 0,2357 
LEV 1,3778 1,8925 -1,8575
†
 
RET/TA 0,0925 0,0889 -0,0229 
NC/TA 0,0507 0,0639 -1,6835
†
 
WCR/TR 0,1350 0,0747 2,0202* 
FA/TA 0,0227 0,0140 2,1268* 
TA/TAg 0,8180 0,8328 0,3816 
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Table 8 
Tests of differences between IBO targets and control sample, averages 3 years before the deal (84 
IBOs) 
Average 
(N-3)/(N-1) 
Variables Median LBO 
Median non 
LBO 
Centered T+ 
Wilcoxon 
A
ct
iv
it
y
 a
n
d
 
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 FCF/TR 0,0533 0,0404 0,0669 
TRGR 0,2324 0,1729 0,941 
Tax/TR 0,0195 0,0059 1,4048 
ROIC 0,2707 0,1843 0,718 
ROE 0,1416 0,1479 0,6244 
B
u
si
n
es
s 
ri
sk
 
CVTRGR 0,0104 0,0128 1,2175 
CVROIC 0,0291 0,0103 0,6422 
CVROE 0,0057 0,0053 0,5842 
CVFCF/TR 0,0006 0,0005 0,4014 
C
o
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
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ac
te
ri
st
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o
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n
d
 f
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u
re
 
TanA/TA 0,1115 0,1277 -1,0715 
LEV 1,4368 1,8962 -0,7136 
RET/TA 0,0794 0,0396 1,0523 
NC/TA 0,0475 0,0245 0,2185 
WCR/TR 0,1560 0,1088 3,3538*** 
FA/TA 0,0712 0,0173 3,7462*** 
TA/TAg 0,8167 0,8025 0,3969 
Differences for variables in bold characters are significant at the 10 % level. 
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Table 9 
Multivariate Logit Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing the LBO Likelihood 
Independent 
variables 
Expected 
sign 
Model I 
Tot. sample 
Model II 
Independant 
Model III 
Group 
Model IV 
MBO 
Model V 
IBO 
Constant  -0,1803 
(-0,2336) 
-1,3002 
(-0,9656) 
2,9405
†
 
(1,8932) 
-0,0263 
(-0,0194) 
-0,5399 
(-0,4830) 
TRGR - 0,0001 
(0,6026) 
-0,0006 
(-0,8563) 
0,0007 
(0,6445) 
-0,0025 
(-0,8495) 
0,0001 
(0,5925) 
FCF/TR + -0,5191 
(-0,5176) 
-0,5711 
(-0,1451) 
-0,2035 
(-0,0746) 
-2,9077 
(-1,0039) 
-0,5792 
(-0,4842) 
CVROIC - -0,0004 
(-1,1802) 
-0,0078 
(0,3567) 
-0,0008 
(-0,5738) 
0,0093 
(0,8833) 
-0,0003 
(-0,8882) 
ROE + -0,0107 
(-0,1662) 
-0,0401 
(-0,2194) 
-0,1851 
(-0,8024) 
-0,2478 
(-0,8905) 
0,0305 
(0,3513) 
WCR/TR - 0,2464 
(1,0919) 
1,4417 
(0,7890) 
-0,1016 
(-0,2982) 
0,2434 
(0,4132) 
0,2103 
(0,8207) 
TanA/TA + 0,2198 
(0,2615) 
-0,5573 
(-0,2737) 
-1,5677 
(-0,8374) 
0,7100 
(0,4463) 
0,5266 
(0,4587) 
FA/TA + 4,0383
***
 
(3,6930) 
4,7937 
(1,6439) 
3,6559
†
 
(1,7891) 
2,4087 
(1,0405) 
4,4692
**
 
(3,0321) 
LEVDT - -0,0030 
(-0,5727) 
-0,0151 
(-0,6915) 
-0,0144 
(-0,4120) 
-0,0100 
(-0,7969) 
-0,0014 
(-0,4627) 
RET/TA + 0,3346 
(0,4347) 
-0,8404 
(-0,5071) 
-2,4059 
(-1,4434) 
-1,4663 
(-1,0389) 
0,6990 
(0,5988) 
TAX/TR + 1,0147 
(0,7007) 
49,6397
**
 
(3,2677) 
-0,5470 
(-0,2172) 
38,6656
**
 
(3,0903) 
0,9018 
(0,5301) 
NC/TA + -0,0772 
(-0,1065) 
-3,0344 
(-1,4674) 
0,3628 
(0,2845) 
-2,1480
†
 
(-1,7088) 
-0,0097 
(-0,0088) 
TA/TAg + -0,2985 
(-0,3324) 
0,3809 
(0,2273) 
-3,5211
*
 
(-1,9909) 
-0,2901 
(-0,1864) 
-0,1677 
(-0,1259) 
Sample size  350 58 61 72 84 
LR statistic  30,6490
**
 33,8710
***
 19,8408
†
 25,1386
*
 20,8618
†
 
McFadden R
2 
 0,0632 0,2106 0,1173 0,1259 0,0896 
AIC  1,3730 1,3184 1,4368 1,3923 1,4169 
Schwarz  1,5163 1,6270 1,7356 1,6604 1,6586 
Notes: 
This table presents the results of five multivariate logit regressions, which include a set of 12 
independent variables for our total sample and different sub-samples. The expected sign in the second 
column refers to the hypotheses summarized in table 3. In addition to the estimated coefficients, the z-
statistic, computed to test the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient, is shown in parentheses. ***, **, * 
and 
† 
indicate statistical significance at the 0,1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. LR indicates 
the p-value of the likelihood ratio test statistic, which is computed to test the hypothesis that all 
parameters of the model are simultaneously equal to zero. The McFadden R
2
 reflects the likelihood 
ratio index of the model. AIC presents the Akaike-Information criterion. Schwarz refers to the 
Schwarz criterion. 
 
 
